this study measured the economic attitudes and values of a random sample of young Americans (high school seniors and future Business Leaders of America members (FBLA)) towards the American Economic System and its essential elements: profits, economic freedom, competition, corporate taxes, business ethics, advertising, and labor unions. The study suggested that the respondents (FBLA members) demonstrated less than affirmative attitudes toward economic and business issues than one would expect based on their training and economic education.

INTRODUCTION

Young Americans’ attitude toward the economic issues is an important determinant of the future of the private enterprise system. In a society where political and economic decision–making is decentralized, the right and responsibility to make decisions rests with individuals. Competent economic policies are, therefore, a function of economic understanding and attitudes of the masses toward profits, economic freedom, competition, government intervention, taxes, business, and the right to work.

Attitudes are widely accepted as a precursor of human behavior. According to Kunkel (1970),

Attitude, thus, is simply a shorthand term for certain abstracted characteristics common to a number of behavior patterns which are frequently repeated whenever certain conditions prevail (p.70).

McClelland (1969) endorses Kunkel’s assertion when he equates attitude with “the probability of recurrence of behavior forms of a given type and direction.” Since attitudes predict actions (particularly in the voting booth), a study of young Americans attitudes may offer some insights into future economic policies and their impact on the American economic system.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Studies of attitudinal change in the area of economics are limited in number and scope. This shortcoming stems partly from the fact that until recently there was no widely accepted nationally normed attitudinal test instrument available for research. Jackstadt and Brennan (1983) were among the first to study the economic knowledge level and attitude of high school students toward the American Economic System, business and labor unions. They were surprised to find not only a profound lack of understanding of the American system, but also downright hostility toward its important institutions.

Charkins, O’Toole and Wetzel (1985) studied how student learning and attitudes could be improved by matching instructional style with student learning style. Using factor analysis, the authors explored the relationship between student score on attitude and expected grade, hours of study, percentage change in Test of Understanding College Economics (TUCE) score and the extent of difference in learning style and teaching style scores. They conclude that the students’ learning and attitudes could be improved by developing instructional strategies that match with students’ learning styles.

Hodgin (1984) developed an econometric model to study how performance information (as reflected in cumulative grade) affected changes in attitude, which in turn determined performance. Hodgin found that there is an interactive relationship between the students’ attitudes and cognitive learning.

Ingels and O’Brien (1985) studied how learner’s attitudes and values were influenced by instruction based on the textbook entitled, Our Economy: How it Works. They used the University of Chicago, Social Science Research Center’s Economic Values Inventory instrument to measure student attitudes (the findings of the study are included in our…

national and European positions of France and the United Kingdom in the post World War Two world. Within this context, their economic security and underlying political values will provide basis for the analysis and comparison of each country’s willingness to accept European integration and co-operation. Intrinsically linked to the economic problems and advantages of this European integration are political factors influencing the politicians who made the decisions in this immediate post war period. The purpose of this essay is to examine which causes appeared most prominently in France and Britain’s willingness (and unwillingness respectively) to join, through the views of a number of leading politicians of the time. To be discussed is whether in fact economic reasons for joining the process were positive or negative in following the political reasons. It is economic integration in relation to the politics of Europe that will be considered because essentially, that was the most successful part of the integration of Europe, as it still continues today.

I will use speeches by Winston Churchill, a main political figure in the UK to explore the reluctance of Britons to enter into economic integration. To support and counter arguments I will use secondary sources and further commentary by other politicians of the time. I will do the same for prominent figures such as Monnet in French politics.

The basis of the argument for the UK will be grounded in Britain’s negative political and economic bias towards Europe, particularly the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The basis for the French argument will be that she was primarily concerned in a positive manner with the economics of the European integration program offered by the European Coal and Steel Community.

A brief history of each country’s position.

Both France and Britain’s economies were damaged after the Second World War; it had caused need for higher spending in sectors of the economy which in normal peace time would be much lower[1]. However, the British economy compared with the other states in Western Europe, appeared to emerge from the War in a somewhat less desperate position. During the early 1950s, 50% of world trade was made in sterling transactions[2] in addition to Britain having her Empire to advantageously trade with. She had not been occupied by German forces during the war and had materialised a stronger relationship with the United States of America through the Allied partnership. France on the other hand had been occupied by German forces and required massive amounts of recuperation after the war. Her economy could not depend so much on colonial trading, and the Rhine area was particularly important to both France and Germany. So the use of this economic tool was in effect a direct benefit to France.

Immediately after the war and in the period up until the creation of the ECSC, the French and British governments both debated and negotiated the contentious issue of European integration. Despite consensus on the need for some form of integration, the origins of each country’s attitude are somewhat different.

The United Kingdom.

When in opposition, Winston Churchill’s (Conservative) main concern with regards to European unity appeared to be political. His drive, as with many other politicians in Europe, was to restore peace. In numerous speeches, he clearly advocated unity in order to achieve this aim. In the House of Commons in 1950 (from the opposition) he said “…we should do all in our power to encourage and promote Franco-German reconciliation as an approach to unity…”[3] This suggests that politics takes the forefront of the stage for Churchill and that he is significantly pro-integration (at this time) for these political reasons. The advantages concerning Churchill are primarily the effects that European unity would have on the Franco-German relationship, German defence and the recuperation of Germany[4]. His speech in the House of Commons in March 1950 does little to suggest that Churchill, from the opposition, is concerned with the positive effects of integrated economics of the unity.

Further to the notion that Churchill was an advocate of political concerns over economic integration is evident in his leadership when in power. Even though the Conservative government of 1951 privatised steel (following the Labour governments’ nationalisation of steel) he did not effectively move Britain any closer to the European integration process. This economic barrier being lifted demonstrates that economic factors were less persuasive for Britain towards Europe. Again in line with political considerations of European integration, Ian Wood comments that Churchill informed the Council of Europe that Britain would not accept any supranational body which had power over its internal mechanisms[5].

A second voice in the House of Commons – that of the equally influential Foreign Secretary of the Labour government – Ernest Bevin counters this assertion with his acknowledgement that “…we are turning to a constructive concept dealing with economic development at the same time.”[6] Taking this comment, it would seem that the House was debating both economic and political factors of joining the European integration process, but where the economic factors were not viewed upon as particularly positive. Bevin’s comment, rather suggests that the economic benefits did not weigh against the political disadvantages at that time.

In addition to Britain’s national economic concerns in the post war period,

is the relationship that Britain maintained with her colonies. The colonial exports and the lack of economic trade barriers that she continued after the war meant that Britain could keep an income that other European states had ceased to have. Members of the House consistently argued that Britain could not drift away from the Commonwealth of exclusive sources. One MP, Mr Ridsdale for Harwich, (Conservative) pointed out that Britain could not afford to retreat into smaller productive means[7]. This economic reason was negatively used in politic; Ridsdale, as one example, used the comparison of the economic security that had been built up over the colonial period to the economic security that those in favour of integration on the continent were trying to create. He belittled the idea of creating a European force under economic terms by labelling it a “…little Europe in an already divided Europe.”[8]

Essentially, Britain had economic reasons that were embedded in political factors for not joining the European integration process so favourably. Because the economic needs of Britain did not match the politics of the European integration process, Britain was more reluctant to join in. So the economic factors of British politics in relation to both domestic and international concerns were used negatively to avoid joining the European integration process.

France.

The attitude of France towards European integration was significantly and somewhat noticeably different. She was directly the cause of integration proposals; to unite her with Germany so war could no longer be an option for solving conflict of interests. Economical factors of integration are viewed more positively by French politicians.

Jean Monnet – considered one of the Founding Fathers of European unity – saw European integration in a predominantly political light, with economics as a positive way to accomplish that which he aimed to solve. Writing in 1962, Monnet reflected that de Gaulle’s ‘concert of Europe’ notion was a positive idea, but suggests that integration should go much further than that[9]. This is evidence that economic factors were merely a way to conceptualise the political ties that would be created in the link between European countries.

Further contributing to the impression that French politicians were concerned with economics as a positive secondary to political benefits is the decolonisation of its colonies. French colonies (mostly on the African continent) were dramatically lost in a series of colonial power struggles after the Second World War. This demonstrated the French ability to continue with positive economic ambitions with European integration and continue to push forward political mergence. Holding onto the colonies was evidently not a constructive mechanism because by the end of their colonial wars, as Robert Paxton points out, the United States was supplying most of France’s war materials[10]. By 1953, France’s gross national income had less than 5 percent from exports to its remaining French territories overseas, while Britain remained much higher with 9 percent to the commonwealth[11]. So France took the economics of this positively and pushed for integration with Germany further.

Outside the two.

In 1957 the former Italian Foreign Trade Minister, Ugo La Malfo pinned the need for European integration down to economic factors which would lead to political co-operation. He said that in order to stop the impoverishment of the people of Europe, a common market must be created to provide Europe with a vast, “powerful productive unit.”[12] He also noted the need for this because “….the rhythm of our economic progress is decidedly slower than that of the great powers.”[13] These comments make it obvious that there was leaning in Italian politics towards European integration for economic necessity.

From inside the European Coal and Steel Community, Paul Delouvrier commented in 1957 that he felt the British should see that the Commonwealth was no longer anything more than “…an old boys’ association which meets every year in a different town.”[14] This is a criticism of the British attitude towards choosing economic ties with the commonwealth over Europe, and has the underlying disapproval of its seeming political stagnation. It accuses the United Kingdom of being a partaker in a talking shop; one that it is head of, the Commonwealth.

Even within the Six (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux[15] countries), there was criticism that their European integration policies were embedded in the political. Delouvrier comments that the representatives in Brussels were not “unaware” of important monetary problems, but instead were more concerned with “…their ministerial political side [coming] uppermost.”[16] So it can be deduced by this that countries within the economic structures of European integration – notably France for this essay – went along with the economics of the set up positively because it satisfied their political motions and ideas.

Summary.

To summarise the main points made in argument that France and Britain viewed the economic factors differently in order to suit their political stance, France essentially used economics for beneficial arguments toward European integration, whereas Britain did not. Churchill’s enthusiasm for integration then unwillingness to push the United Kingdom to join when he was in power in 1951 demonstrates that the economic benefits for Britain were not taken as a convincing factor. Bevin noted also that economic factors played a secondary role to the political factors of integration; the joining of French and German Coal and Steel was a means to the ends of peace. The United Kingdom’s colonial economic trading was an economic factor that was used in discussion to dissuade approval of the economic benefits proposed by European integration.

As for France, the case was different. Monnet’s vision of integration was predominantly political; peace and influence in the global sphere. Prosperity was again merely a means to these ends, the same as Bevin noted. However the attitude towards these means was much more positive than that of Britain. Unlike the United Kingdom’s colonial ties, France’s were in tatters and this posed no negative argument for its joining the European ideal; because the European deal offered much tighter benefits than those of what remained of France’s outside ties.

Conclusion.

France’s optimism towards economics as a means for uniting herself with Germany is demonstrated clearly through the factors summarised above. As Monnet said in 1962, “…the West are witnessing the emergence of a truly mass society marked by mass consumption…”[17], implying that the political and societal unity is intrinsically linked to positively economic methods. In addition, La Malfo proclaimed that “…throwing this bridge across the Rhine…” represented the only way that European antagonism could be solved[18].

In comparison to these optimistic views of the usefulness of economic ties in uniting Europe, is the British reluctance to commit to any positive European economic integration to begin with. The British appeared to use economic factors as reasons to stay outside of the fast moving European integration on the continent. Instead, they looked more positively towards economics that included the Commonwealth and Empire such as the attempt to set up the Free Trade Area around 1957.

Britain no doubt served as a contentious partner in discussions over the integration of Europe. While she started out as a country with strong advocates for European integration (such as Churchill), the attitude within Britain was not one that was willing to accept economic factors that would pull her away from her preferred imperial trading. Whereas France saw the unity through economic terms in a positive and more enthusiastic light. Nelson and Stubb comment in their introduction to the preambles of the Rome Treaties, that the treaties demonstrated a shift towards more economic prosperity concern than to peace in Europe[19]. The emphasis in the Rome Treaties on economics only highlights the British pessimistic perspective of exclusive trade within Europe, and away from the colonies.

As La Malfo noted in 1957, “When speaking of European integration, it is difficult to separate economic from political considerations.”[20] So the assertion here is that even though the economics was used to achieve the ends of peace in Europe, from the positions of the United Kingdom and France came two very different uses of economic situation. The United Kingdom was hesitant to see the economic benefits that the European Coal and Steel Community could offer, while France used the economics as reason to back up her argument to enter.

Bibliography

Books.

Curtis, M, Western European integration, (New York; Harper & Row, 1965)

Davidson, I, Britain and the making of Europe, (London; Macdonald, 1971)

Haines, C. G., (ed) European Integration, (Baltimore; John Hopkins Press, 1957)

Kitzinger, U. (ed), Britain, Europe and Beyond, (Leyden, A.W; Sythoff, 1964)

Nelson and Stubb (eds) The European Union : readings on the theory and practice of European integration, (Boulder, Colo; L. Rienner, 1998)

Paxton, Robert O, Europe in the Twentieth Century, (Ontario; Wadsworth, 2005)

Wood, Ian S, Churchill, (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 2000)

Official documentation.

Churchill in Hansard 1950, volume 473

Bevin in Hansard 1950, volume 473

Ridsdale in Hansard 1958, volume 481

Class lectures.

2nd November 2005.

Written by: Catherine Powell

Written at: University of Victoria, BC Canada

Economists, sociologists and political scientists have long been interested in explaining the economic success of certain countries and the persistent poverty of others.

The first, and most famous example, is the German sociologist Max Weber. In his 1905 treatise, “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism”, Weber attributes the emergence of capitalism to the Protestant doctrine of salvation and concept of good works.

Though the original debate centred on the economic virtues of Protestantism versus Catholicism, today’s debate encompasses the economic effect of all major religions.

In a new study, “People’s Opium? Religion and Economic Attitudes”, Luigi Zingales, a professor at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business, Luigi Guiso of the University of Sassari, Italy, and Paolo Sapienza of Northwestern University’s Kellogg School of Management take a new approach to answering the question of whether religion has an impact on a country’s economic development.

Previous research on this topic has focused on cross-country studies. The problem with this approach, however, is the difficulty of distinguishing between effects that are specific to religion and those that are specific to the country.

Zingales, Guiso and Sapienza’s new approach focuses on the differences in religion within a given country, pooled across 66 countries. In doing so they eliminate the spurious effect of other environmental variables and can focus on the link between religion and attitudes, such as trust, that have been found to be conducive to economic growth.

The authors find that religious beliefs are generally associated with “good” economic attitudes, where “good” is defined as attitudes conducive to higher per capita income and growth. Religious people tend to trust others more, trust the government and legal system more, are less willing to break the law, and are more likely to believe that markets’ outcomes are fair. There are exceptions, however. Religious people tend to be more racist and less favourable to the rights of working women.

Of the six major religious denominations represented in the survey (Catholicism, Protestantism, Judaism, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism), the authors find that overall, Christian religions are more positively associated with attitudes conducive to economic growth, while Islam is more negatively associated.

World values

The authors based their study on data from the World Values Survey, a collection of surveys administered to a representative sample of people in 66 countries from 1981 to 1997, coordinated by the Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The surveys contain information about demographics (sex, age, education) and self-reported economic characteristics (income, social class). These data allow the authors to control for differences in individual characteristics. The survey also included answers to specific questions about religion, political preferences and economic attitudes, including religious affiliation, intensity of beliefs (frequency of attending religious service), and whether or not the person was raised religiously.

The authors analysed how religion in general, independent of denomination, affects six groups of variables: 1) attitudes towards trust and cooperation; 2) attitudes towards working women; 3) attitudes towards the government; 4) attitudes towards legal rules; 5) attitudes towards the market economy and its fairness; and 6) attitudes towards thriftiness.

On average, the authors find that religion is positively associated with attitudes conducive to free markets. Both a religious upbringing and active religious participation increase trust towards government institutions and markets. However, being religious is also linked to greater intolerance towards others and a more conservative attitude towards working women.

Results are generally the opposite for self-proclaimed atheists: They are more tolerant of others; less trusting of the government and the police; have more progressive attitudes towardss working women; trust the legal system less; are more willing to break the law; and have worse attitudes towards the market and its perceived fairness.

Spectrum of beliefs

In terms of economic impact, the three most relevant attitudes are: the degree to which people are willing to accept inequality (for example, in income) in order to provide better incentives; the degree to which people are willing to support private over public ownership; and whether people think competition is good.

The authors find that the six denominations differ most in their position on the trade-off between income equality and incentives. Catholics and, to a greater extent, Muslims and Jews are biased in favour of income equality, while Protestants, Hindus and Buddhists are more in favour of incentives.

Religious denominations also differ in their attitude towards private ownership. Buddhists, Catholics, Protestants and Hindus support private ownership more than the average non-religious person. In contrast, Muslims show considerably less support for private ownership.

Regarding competition, Buddhists, Jews, Catholics and Protestants support competition, while religious Muslims and Hindus are strongly opposed to competition.

In addressing attitudes about poverty, the authors find that religious people of all denominations except Buddhism are more inclined to believe that the poor are lazy and lack willpower, rather than being shortchanged by society.

In sum, Buddhism seems to promote the most positive attitudes towards the free market system, with Christian religions following. Muslims and Hindus showed the most negative attitudes towards the free market system.

Free markets

Based on their findings, the authors suggest that religious beliefs may explain why capitalism spread so successfully in East Asia (where Buddhism prevails), while finding less support in Islamic countries.

For most of the religious denominations represented in the survey, religion is not necessarily a hindrance to building support for a market economy. For example, it does not seem that the relative underdevelopment of Catholic versus Protestant countries is due to Catholicism itself. However, as Zingales notes, the religion that stands out in many dimensions is Islam, because Muslims tend to be opposed to many aspects of the free market system, including private property, granting incentives, competition and tolerance of women’s participation in the workforce.

With regard to current events, Zingales observes, “If we go by these results, I think the Americans trying to build a market-based democracy in Iraq should be prepared for a wild ride.”

- Capital Ideas, reprinted with permission from Chicago Graduate School of Business.

Luig Zingales is Robert C McCormack Professor of Entrepreneurship and Finance at the University of Chicago Graduate School of Business.

Jonathan Kelley

Krzysztof Zagorski

M.D.R. Evans

The International Survey of Economic Attitudes (ISEA) is a collaborative international project which conducts tri-annual surveys in half a dozen nations, each based on large, representative national samples. The first round was in 1991-1993 (Australia, Hungary, Poland) and the second round in 1994-1997 (Australia, Bulgaria, Finland, and Poland, with the Netherlands still to come). The third round will be in 1998-2000. We hope to extend the geographic coverage to several developing nations in this round.

The ISEA is an off-shoot of the International Social Survey Programme’s long established ‘Ideology of Inequality’ project. The International Social Survey Programme is one of sociology’s best known and most successful international programs, annually collecting exactly comparable attitude and value data from large, representative national samples in 28 nations. Its surveys typically include about 60 questions, using exactly the same wording and sequencing in all nations, plus about 25 carefully measured demographic and background variables coded to rigorous academic standards. The ‘Inequality’ project began with data from nine nations in 1987 (including Hungary and Poland, at the time still Communist). It was repeated in 18 nations in 1992 (Australia, Austria, Britain, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, East Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, the Philippines, Poland, Russia, Slovenia, Sweden, and the USA). It will be repeated again in 1999 in 28 nations. The ‘Inequality’ module was originally developed by two of the ISEA principal investigators and the drafting groups for the 1987, 1992 and 1999 surveys chaired by them.
Topics

The ISEA further develops and greatly extends the range of topics covered by the ‘Ideology of Inequality’ module, asking about 400 questions (around 200 are asked of everyone; about 150 only of those currently employed; and about 50 asked only of those who once owned their own business). The issues covered include:

Income inequality — education, authority and other causes of actual differences in income; and the normative views that legitimate income inequality in the eyes of ordinary citizens; the effect of economic development on inequality and attitudes toward inequality.

Social class — causes of people’s actual class location; subjective influences on perceptions of class and class conflict; and its political and economic consequences; and

Economic policy — citizens’ views on the proper organization of the economy, especially concerning redistribution, government ownership and regulation, tariffs and subsidies; and the effect of income inequality and social class on these. Government versus private employment

ISEA thus deals with several of sociology’s fundamental problems, ones with important theoretical implications for economics and political science and important practical implications for economic development.
Measurement

The ISEA is creative, extending existing research in new directions and opening up unexplored areas. Much of it is based on innovative new measurement instruments — particularly concerning public attitudes toward inequality, perceptions of class, and economic policy.

Most measures are carefully designed multiple item scales, rigorously tested in several nations. Such scales give much more persuasive and precise measurement than single items - a vital matter in cross-national research on attitudes and values. All questions are asked in precisely the same way in all nations.
Publications

The ISEA group has published extensively in the world’s best sociology journals:

* “Class and Class Conflict in Six Western Nations”, American Sociological Review 1995;
* “The Legitimation of Inequality: Norms on Occupational Earnings in Nine Nations”, American Journal of Sociology 1993;
* “Immigrant Entrepreneurship”, American Sociological Review 1989;
* “Women’s Labour Force Participation and Socioeconomic Development” British Journal of Sociology 1993;
* “Prejudice, Discrimination and the Labor Market: Attainments of Immigrants in Australia” American Journal of Sociology 1991;
* “Language skill, Language Usage, and Opportunity” Sociology: The Journal of the British Sociological Association 1987;
* “National Context, Parental Socialization, and Religious Belief” American Sociological Review 1997;
* “Images of Class: A Comparative Analysis of Public Perceptions in Hungary and Australia” American Sociological Review 1992.

Work in progress includes:

“Economic Change and the Legitimation Of Inequality: The Transition From Socialism to the Free Market in Poland and Hungary, 1987-1997″; “Subjective Social Class: International and Individual Level Differences in 21 Nations, 1987-1997″; “Industrialization and Income Inequality: Brazil 1973-1988″; “Human Capital and the Legitimation of Inequality: Public Opinion in Three Nations”.
Institutions

Institutions involved in the ISEA are:

* Australia: Australian National University and the Melbourne Institute of Applied Economic and Social Research, University of Melbourne (Jonathan Kelley, M.D.R. Evans)
* Bulgaria: Institute of Sociology, Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (Tsocho Zlatkov)
* Finland: Turku University (Olli Kangas, Heikki Ervasti)
* Hungary: Social Research Informatics Center (TARKI) and Eotvos University, Budapest (Peter Robert)
* Netherlands: Interuniversity Center for Social Science Theory and Methodology (Universities of Groningen, Nijmegen, and Utrecht; Harry Ganzeboom, Merove Gijsberts)
* Poland: Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences, Warsaw (Krzysztof Zagorski)

Joining the ISEA

The ISEA is primarily an academic research project, with the data generally available to members of the project and their students. If you would like to join the project, please get in touch with us. The requirements are consent of the principal investigators and the contribution of an ISEA survey. Specifically the survey needs to be a high quality, nationally representative sample of 1000 or more cases, including the complete ISEA in a form exactly comparable to other surveys in the project, conducted in a country not yet covered by the ISEA. The survey might be of your own country or another. A survey in the USA, Asia, or Latin America would be particularly welcome.

Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (editors)

Copyright EH.Net (c) 2002

Walter Scheidel and Sitta von Reden (editors), The Ancient Economy (Edinburgh Readings on Ancient World Series). Edinburgh:, Edinburgh University Press, [2002, xxi + 282p. £16.99 Paperback, £45 Hardback. ISBN: 0-7486-1321-8, 0-7486-1322-6]

Reviewed for EH.NET by Morris Silver, Professor Emeritus, Department of Economics, City College of the City University of New York.

In 1973, the classical scholar Moses Finley (1973, 1985, 1999) unveiled a view of the economic underpinnings of ancient economies in which markets and economic motivations played little if any role. Status and civic ideology governed the allocation of scarce resources. Hence, the application of economic theory to the ancient economy was at best a futile exercise and at worst a source of grave misunderstandings. By “ancient economy” Finley had in mind only the economy of classical civilization–i.e. of the Graeco-Roman area beginning roughly in the earlier first millennium BC. However, Finley’s perspective found completion and generalization in the works of the economic historian Karl Polanyi (1981).¹ Polanyi argued forcefully that the ancient Near East did not know markets and, like Finley, he was implacably opposed to the application of economic theory to ancient economic life. Thus was formed a new orthodoxy. Suggestions in the literature of ancient market behavior or economic motivation might simply be ignored or dismissed in a condescending manner as mere “anachronism”. The latter criticism was found devastating by Greek and Roman scholars.

The world of scholarship is rarely completely static, however. Scholars came forward with new evidence and new interpretations pointing to a significant role for markets. In their “Introduction” Scheidel and von Reden* (S&R) (p. 3) explain that

Critics question the real-life impact of elite mentality and identify appparent tensions between the historical record and the model that was meant to make sense of it. They tend to emphasise the considerable scale of economic activities (above all trade) and, make a case for significant economic growth in the Roman imperial period when political and fiscal unification boosted market exchanges.

This, it may be added, represents only the tip of the critical iceberg. Thus, the study of the ancient economy became an “academic battleground”.² As a result of this battle the influence of the Finley/Polanyi orthodoxy has unquestionably waned.³ At present the study of the ancient economy might be compared to a minefield, full of perils for the unsuspecting scholar.

Thus it is most encouraging to learn from the publisher’s website⁴ that the Greek and Roman scholars involved in the publication of The Ancient Economy aim to move the debate beyond “partisan controversies”. S&R (3-4) seem to second the call for studies moving the debate beyond the Finley/Polanyi agenda and benefiting from “the conceptual and analytical repertoire of modern economics”. Obviously, a new synthesis is badly needed even if, to begin with, it is confined to the Greek and Roman periods.

Concerning to the realities of the volume it is certainly not reassuring that in the lead article (originally published in 1998), Greek specialist Paul Cartledge (15) takes as a given Finley’s view that “the categories of neoclassical economic analysis” have “no useful application to ‘the ancient economy’.” Cartledge goes on to consider how we should “set about formulating usable and useful models”.⁵ We search his contribution vainly for the citation of even one example in which the predictions of economic theory are falsified by economic events in the Graeco-Roman economy. No synthesis, no new evidence and no usable new model can be detected here!

Turning to the closing (previously unpublished) article, as is my wont in collections⁶ of this kind, Roman specialist Richard Saller (253) agrees with Finley that modern economic theory is inappropriate for antiquity because of an “incomparability in economic organization”. The problem, Saller suggests, is the absence in antiquity of integrated markets: .

Had the markets been fully integrated, there should not have been desperate grain shortages in individual cities, at the same time as other cities were well supplied…In such cases hungry urban dwellers did not depend solely on higher market prices to draw larger supplies from elsewhere in the [Roman] Empire. but resort to imperial intervention…In an integrated market, this sort of supervision would have been superfluous because pricing would have drawn grain to areas in need. (Saller 254 with n. 2)

Understandably, not being imbued with the trained suspicions of the modern economist, it does not occur to Saller that imperial “supervision” and not the absence of “fully integrated markets” kept the grain away from hungry cities! The classic example is provided by a serious famine at Antioch in AD 362/3. Despite the enlightened protests of Libanius and others, Emperor Julian had responded to rising grain prices caused by a severe and prolonged drought with an edict of maximum prices and the sale of imported grain at prices below the market-clearing level. These well-meant but counterproductive measures served mainly to misallocate the available stock of grain (see Downey 1951: 315-19; de Jonge 1948). They also operated to discourage large landowners (and other speculators) from storing grain.⁷The problem here was not transport costs/fragmented markets but a much more significant problem: failure to understand the economic facts of life.⁸

The remainder of Saller’s contribution includes some cautionary observations on the scale of Roman economic growth. The ancients did of course accumulate material and human capital and they introduced important technical innovations. Clearly, the industrial era’s increased reliance on scientific knowledge and its increased range and variety of fixed capital goods have steeply accelerated the rate of technical progress and material growth. It must not be overlooked, however, that dramatic improvements in living standards are attainable through improvements in economic organization. The evidence demonstrates that ancient civilizations experienced lengthy periods of market activity and prosperity, including even affluence, interspersed with periods of pervasive economic regulation by the state and, ultimately, economic retrogression. There can be no doubt, for example, that something very important happened to Roman living standards between Romulus and Remus and Diocletian!

Perhaps there is more evidence of a move beyond partisan controversy towards a new synthesis in some of the contributions positioned between Cartledge and Saller. I proceed selectively and begin with a useful, previously published article by historian Reger because of its possible bearing on the question of integrated markets raised by Saller. Reger compares time-series of prices for a number of imported commodities (oil, perfume, papyrus, pitch). The price data are taken from from priestly inscriptions on the island of Delos dating to the Hellenistic period in the third and second centuries BC. The prices of the various commodities display markedly different patterns. This finding is understood by S&R (133-34) to undermine the view that the Hellenistic market was integrated (Reger 145). The assumption underlying this conclusion seems to be that economic integration requires prices to be determined by “general economic trends”/ “broader interregional developments” meaning, apparently, that all prices must change in the same direction. Have S&R identified price inflation/deflation with economic integration? Obviously, integration across spatially distant markets is quite consistent with an unchanged general level of prices combined with pronounced changes in relative prices–i.e., perfume rises in price, oil prices decline. Indeed, such changes are commonplace in the contemporary economy and in no way indicate an absence of integrated markets.

The beginning of a trend toward synthesis can indeed be seen in the (previously published) contribution by the French historian Andreau. I especially appreciated his suggestion that

To contrast, term by term, everything pre-industrial with everything modern, and endlessly to scour antiquity for all possible and imaginable signs of archaism, results in a very reductionist view of history. Besides, whether deliberate or not, such an approach has the effect of providing present-day institutions and situations with an intellectual justification which they do not always merit, and of strengthening our reassuring (but illusory) impression that they are eternal, or at least immortal, since we have now entered modernity. (Andreau 35)⁹

While there is room for disagreement Andreau’s article merits close and respectful attention.

A (previously published) article by archaeologist Halstead also is helpful. He sees “famine-brokering” as a partial answer to “what is arguably the most important problem in the ancient economy ‘how did rich Greeks and Romans in classical antiquity acquire their wealth?’” (68). Selling stored grain on the market in periods of exceptionally high prices “may well hold the key to the original emergence of a rich minority, given that current ancient historical orthodoxy seems…to have ruled out all the obvious alternatives” (Halstead 69) (emphasis added). Of course, the “obvious alternatives” for becoming wealthy would be reinstated in any new synthesis! Thus, archaeologist Hitchner (76) in his discussion of growth in the olive oil industry in the Roman provinces of North Africa observes

the proliferation of small farms with one or two presses often in close proximity to oileries, and frequently on agricultural marginal lands… That is, the decision to construct a large stone lever press…, particularly when much more modest means of extracting oil for subsistence needs were available, implies that surplus oil production was the ultimate objective of the small farm occupants. Although the capital for these presses is likely, in many instances, to have come from the owners of the nearby oilieries interested in the oleocultural development of marginal lands in or around their estates, we may also see in these arrangements an effort by the farms’ occupants, whether independent small-holders, free tenants or even slaves, to better their lot. (emphasis added)

Let it be noted that Hitchner published these words in 1993 when proponents of the idea that members of the ancient public might become rich by means of productive activity were still likely to risk being derided as “anachronistic”.¹⁰ With respect to the sources of Athenian wealth in the fourth century BC Osborne (128-30) tentatively raises the possibilities, “against firmly held modern convictions”, that manufacture was of some importance and that agriculture was actually profitable.

The Ancient Economy, much to my surprise, actually does include a number of contributions (Andreau, Halstead, Hitchner plus the “Introduction”) that move the discussion beyond partisan controversy toward a new synthesis. The volume has the additional merit of bringing together in one place valuable previously published articles by Hopkins, Panella/Tchernia, and Rathbone. On the other hand, the articles by Saller and, especially, Cartledge cling to the Finley/Polanyi orthodoxy. Their strategic placement in the book, first and last chapters, betrays a serious tension in the conception of the editors. To conclude, this is a collection that scholars of the ancient world should be pleased to have in their libraries.

I do have one strong complaint. The editors (4) note that “It goes without saying that it is impossible for a collection of this kind to cover all the bases.” Agreed, but why in a volume devoted to economic history do we find classicists, historians, archaeologists and even a philosopher but not a single contribution by a professional economist? The omission is glaring and revealing.

Notes*About the Editors: Walter Scheidel, formerly Moses and Mary Finley Research Fellow of Darwin College, Cambridge, currently teaches Ancient History at the University of Chicago; Sitta von Reden is Senior Lecturer in Classics and Ancient History at the University of Bristol.

1. I have relied upon Polanyi’s posthumously published manuscript entitled The Livelihood of Man (1981). The editor of this volume, Harry W. Pearson, has included material on Polanyi’s life and has contributed a useful introduction citing Polanyi’s major publications and placing his thought in perspective.

2. The “Suggestions for further Reading” include recent contributions on both sides of the controversy.

3. Interestingly, as their empirical base deteriorated some scholars loyal to this “primitivist/substantivist” school began to denigrate the use of empirical evidence and, more and more, to stress the importance of “erudite models” (see note 6 below). Indeed, even Finley (1985: 182) in “Further Thoughts,” appealed to historical and anthropological/sociological “models” as opposed to “the continual evocation of individual ‘facts’.”

4. http://www.eup.ed.ac.uk/cgi/odbic.exe?input=NewWeb/Books/2175.htm

5. In modern economics models are conceptual structures capable of being manipulated to make predictions, which may be tested against empirical evidence. For Finley/Polanyi scholars, however, a model is “a heuristic device for organizing data into an intelligible whole” (Stager 2001: 625). As Finley (1985: 182) explained in “Further Thoughts,” “models” are “valuable in obscuring incidental detail and in allowing fundamental aspects of reality to appear.” “Model” serves as an objective-sounding name for a priori positions that are employed to sift, shape, interpret or avoid the evidence.

6. With two exceptions the articles included in The Ancient Economy were originally published elsewhere. The editors contribute an introduction and chapter commentaries. With one exception the contributions are authored by classicists, historians and archaeologists. The exception is a reprinted contribution by philosopher Scott Meikle who, while critical of modern economic theory, is quite adept at manipulating the Marxist categories of “use value” and “exchange value”.

7. Halstead (S&R 69) notes that the Roman writer Varro advised landowners to store grain in order to take advantage of high market prices in times of famine.

8. Readers interested in market integration in the Roman world might consult Temin (2001).

9. One might consider in the light of Andreau’s remarks Douglass North’s (1991: 98) pursuit of the “Holy Grail” of a once-and-for-all incremental evolution of efficient institutions.

10. Hitchner (80-1) was well aware of the professional risk he was taking in citing empirical evidence for significant growth in the Roman economy.

ReferencesDowney, Glanville. (1951). “The Economic Crisis at Antioch under Julian the Apostate.” In P.R. Coleman-Norton (ed.), Studies in Roman Economic and Social History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 312- 21.

Finley, Moses. (1973, 1985, 1999). The Ancient Economy. Berkeley: University of California Press.

de Jonge, P. (1948). “Scarcity of Corn and Corn Prices in Ammianus Marcellinus.” Mnemosyne, 1, 238-45.

North, Douglass C. (1991). “Institutions.” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 5, 97-112.

Polanyi, Karl. (1981). The Livelihood of Man. Harry W. Pearson (ed.). New York: Academic.

Stager. Lawrence E. (2001). “Port Power in the Early and the Middle Bronze Age: The Organization of Maritime Trade and Hinterland Production.” In Samuel R. Wolff (ed.), Studies in the Archaeology of Israel and Neighboring Lands. Chicago: Oriental Institute, 625-38.

Temin, Peter. (2001), “A Market Economy in the Early Roman Emprire.” Journal of Roman Studies, 91, 169-81.

Suggestions for Further ReadingBleiberg, Edward. (1995). “The Economy of Ancient Egypt.” In Jack M. Sasson, John Baines, Gary Beckman, and Karen S. Rubinson. (eds.), Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, Vol. III. New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1373-85.

Cartledge, Paul, Edward E. Cohen, and Lin Foxhall. (eds.) (2002). Money, Labour and Land: Approaches to the Economies of Ancient Greece. London: Routledge.

Castle, Edward W. (1″2). “Shipping and Trade in Ramesside Egypt.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 35, 239-77.

Cohen, Edward E. (1992). Athenian Economy and Society. A Banking Perspective. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Dercksen, Jan Gerrit. (ed.) (1999). Trade and Finance in Ancient Mesopotamia. Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Instanbul.

Donlan, Walter. (forthcoming). “Homer and Hesiod on Commerce and Trade”. In Rollinger and Ulf (eds.), Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World.

Engels, Donald. (1990). Roman Corinth: An Alternative Model for the Classical City. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Figueira, Thomas J. (1984). “Karl Polanyi and Ancient Greek Trade: The Port of Trade.” Ancient World, 10, 15-30.

Greene, Kevin. (2000). “Technological Innovation and Economic Progress in the Ancient World: M.I. Finley Re-considered.” Economic History Review, 53, 29-59.

Hudson, Michael and Baruch A. Levine. (eds.) (1999). Urbanization and Land Ownership in the Ancient Near East. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, Harvard University.

Hudson, Michael and Marc Van De Mieroop.(eds.) (2002). Debt and Economic Renewal in the Ancient Near East. Bethesda, Maryland: CDL Press.

Mattingly, David .J. (1988). “Oil for Export? A Comparison of Libyan, Spanish, and Tunisian Olive Oil Production in the Roman Empire.” Journal of Roman Archaeology, 1, 33-56.

Mattingly, David J., David Stone, Lea Sterling and Nejib Ben Lazreg. (2001). “Leptimus (Tunisia): A ‘Producer’ City?.” In David J. Mattingly and John Salmon (eds.), Economies Beyond Agriculture in the Classical World. London: Routledge, 66-89.

Menu, Bernadette (2001a). “Economy: Overview”. In Redford (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt. Vol. 1, 422-6.

Menu, Bernadette (2001b). “Economy: Private Sector”. In Redford (ed.), The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt. Vol. 1, 430-3.

Millett, Paul. (1991). Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olivier, Jean-Pierre. (1987). “Des Extraits De Contrats De Vente D’Esclaves Dans Les Tablettes De Knossos.” In John T. Killen, José L. Melena, and Jean-Pierre Olivier (eds.), Studies in Mycenaean and Classical Greek . Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 479-98.

Purcell, Nicholas. (1990). “Mobility and the Polis.” In Oswyn Murray and Simon Price (eds.), The Greek City from Homer to Alexander. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 29-58.

Redford, Donald B. (ed.)(2001). The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt. 3 vols. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Rollinger, Robert and Christoph Ulf (eds.)(forthcoming). Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World (5th International MELAMMU Conference, Innsbruck Oct. 3rd-8th 2002).

Silver, Morris. (1995). Economic Structures of Antiquity. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press.

Silver, Morris. (forthcoming). “Modern Ancients”. In Rollinger and Ulf (eds.), Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World.

David M. Schaps, Associate Professor of Classical Studies at Bar-Ilan University in Israel

Copyright EH.Net 2004

David M. Schaps, The Invention of Coinage and the Monetization of Ancient Greece. Ann Arbor, Michigan, Michigan University Press, [2004, 312p. 13 photographs, $48 Cloth. ISBN 0-472-11333-X]

Reviewed for EH.NET by Morris Silver, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Department of Economics, City College of the City University of New York

Briefly stated, Schaps’ (hereinafter S) central argument runs as follows:

Coinage=Money, in the Greek experience the two are equated, was invented in Greece or Asia Minor (Lydia) in the later seventh or earlier sixth century. The Greeks eagerly copied/adapted this innovation and it spread rapidly in their cities during the sixth century. The result was a profound transformation in Greek economy and society. Before the Greek adoption of coinage, the ancient Mediterranean world knew only primitive money, not money as we know it. Primitive money was incapable of generating the revolution that Greece experienced.
I begin with a number of quotations capturing the argument and then, in the main part of the review, move on to consider the details.

This book will tell the story � of the development of money both in the Near East and in Greece up to the invention of coinage and its widespread adoption by the Greek cities, the only communities that adopted it wholeheartedly at its first appearance. (17)

Something new happened with the invention of coinage, and it produced a new idea that persists to our day. (5)

I have tried throughout only to sketch the ways in which Greek thought and behavior were changed by the introduction of money. (vii)

From the Greeks onward, we find a new way of speaking and of thinking. Now a person might state the entirety of a household’s possessions in terms money, as no member of a premonetary society would ever do. (16)

One of the central propositions of this book is that when we speak historically, the invention of coinage was the invention of money: that is, the concept that we understand as “money” did not exist before the seventh century B.C.E., when coins were first minted. There surely had been many items before that we may recognize correctly, as money, there were even places�where a single item performed all the functions associated with money. Never before, however, had these items been conceptualized as money, for money to the Greeks, as to us, was the measure of all things. Something different in nature from all the valuables that might represent it. (15; emphasis in original)

All ancient Near Eastern societies had a conventional standard of value, usually precious metals or a specified grain. The standard of payment was always “primitive money,” never coin, and it did not always perform all the functions that coin was later to perform�.If Greece was the cradle of coinage and Lydia its birthplace, the societies of the Near East were its ancestors. (34)

S links the unprecedented Greek adoption of coinage with Greek backwardness.

The Greeks,� who had only very primitive forms of currency, thought of coins as they had never thought of those items in which they had once traded, evaluated and paid. An ideal that had grown up in the East at a time when Greece had no need for it suddenly dawned on the Greeks when coins appeared. It was a time when the Greeks were in a period of economic and intellectual expansion for which their relatively primitive economic concepts did not provide an adequate basis�. Precisely because of their economic backwardness, they had no sufficient preexisting conceptual structure to compete with or subordinate the idea of money. (16-17)

Why did the ancient Near East (ANE) not move from a very evident monetization to “money, as we know it”? Technology would not have raised a barrier to the transformation. (16, 222).

Why were coins so exciting to the Greeks and so uninteresting to their neighbors? The answer is that they filled a need peculiar to Greek society�It was Greece that was searching for new forms of government and administration to manage the new complexity of the poleis and new ways of organization to maintain its people, and coins made that administration and that organization simpler and more manageable than spits and cauldrons [primitive money] could have done. (108)

This is interesting, but not entirely convincing. An alternative line of explanation is that coinage (guaranteed money) is not nearly as important economically as S supposes. The alleged special interest of the Greeks in coinage may then reflect an ideological dimension peculiar to the Greeks. S mentions “the particular Greek appreciation of the universality of money” (196) There is also a real question, explored below, whether Greece was really so backward monetarily as S suggests.

S’ presentation is quite clear and, obviously, there is rich material here. The view that coinage was invented by the Lydians is one that is generally accepted by scholars. I do have some problems with the equation of money with coinage and the meaning of “primitive money”. There is also something of a problem with respect to whom, according to S, invented coinage: On the one hand, the Lydians invented coins and then the Greeks eagerly used them. On the other hand, the time when the Greeks eagerly used coins is the time of invention. These are relatively minor issues and I put them aside. On to the details!

I. Did the ancient Near East know coinage?

A. Indirect Evidence

1. S states that a “discussion of the factors that go into price determination does not form part of this book, for their importance arises in a money economy, and the point at which the Greeks achieved a money economy is the point at which this study ends.” (30) I am not sure exactly what this means. S is perhaps suggesting that the forces of supply and demand determine prices only in an economy with money, which equates with coinage. This is, of course, completely false. Later S adds “The Babylonian economy was still not, as it would become in the Hellenistic period, dominated by a market where prices changed each day; but it was not immune to the law of supply and demand.” (49) This is a heroic understatement! Although we do not have daily price data, there is ample evidence of price changes and of the operation of supply and demand. Indeed, the Old Babylonian period (earlier second millennium BCE) has been characterized by Hallo (1958: 98) as one in which “there was a price on everything from the skin of a gored ox to the privilege of a temple office”.

2. Silver was indeed used as a means of payment in the ANE.(51) However, rather than spreading through the population, it remained in the hands of merchants. (51) “It never became, as coins eventually would, synonymous with wealth itself. It could not have done so, if only because too few people owned it. For this reason, the Babylonians never thought of silver as we think of money. (51)

The surviving documents do not demonstrate that Mesopotamians thought of money in the same way the Greeks did. Caution is justified about the reason for this presumed difference. There is evidence for the dispersal of precious metals in the population. As early as the middle of the third millennium in Ebla (in Syria) silver was used to purchase ordinary goods including clothing and grain as well as wine and semi-precious stones (Archi 1993: 52). Mesopotamian texts of the middle of the second half of the third millennium already show us street vendors, and, according to Foster (1977: 35-36, nn.47, 48), the use of silver to pay rents and purchase dates, oil, barley, animals, slaves, and real estate; in addition, “silver was widely used in personal loans and was often in possession of private citizens and officials”.

3. S asserts: “The silver of the Near East had never been coined; it was weighed at each transaction, and the scale was an essential accessory to every sale.”(49) This statement goes beyond the evidence. It is not true that ANE texts invariably, or even commonly, mention weighing and/or scales. Indeed, to my knowledge, the mention of scales is infrequent. Nevertheless, S is on strong ground in stressing the centrality of weighing in the transactions recorded in the Bible.¹

B. Direct Evidence

S maintains that “an examination of the various primitive items that have at one time or another been claimed to be coins fails to reveal any clear example, and it may be useful to clear the air of the various hypotheses, which by their very number can create the false impression that coinage was common in the eastern Mediterranean Basin long before the Lydians and the Greeks.”(222-23) Elsewhere he maintains that “the verisimilitude of the preceding suggestion is not much above zero”. (235) S may well be correct in rejecting this hypothesis. However, his treatment of the evidence leaves something to be desired.

1. The evidence is reasonably clear that the ANE went a good part of the way toward coinage by circulating ingots of guaranteed quality. Assyrian loan contracts of the eighth to seventh centuries use various formulas to advance “silver of (the goddess) Ishtar (of the city) Arbela (or Nineveh or Bit Kidmuri).” Lipinski (1979) argued brilliantly against interpreting this phrase to mean “temple capital.” Expressions of this kind, he suggested, refer to the quality of the metal, and their inclusion in contracts makes no sense unless the metal is impressed with a stamp of guarantee. The practice of guaranteeing metal quality, it may be added, probably goes back to the second millennium. The expression “silver of the gods” is found in texts from Mari in Syria and Amarna in Egypt. For example, in a letter concerning the disposition of an inheritance the king of Mari refers to the deceased person’s “silver of the gods” (Malamat 1998: 185; cf. CAD s.v. ilu 1.e).

In discussing the ingots from the temple of Arbela S concludes:

There was nothing particularly important about this development as far as Assyria was concerned. The temple’s ingots, even if stamped, were no more than good quality silver�It will have been the business of a merchant to recognize them and to know good silver from bad, but there was nothing revolutionary about them. They may have come in convenient sizes�, but they were hardly standardized, and it is hard to imagine that a merchant would have failed to put them on the scale before accepting them. (92)

A guarantee of metal quality surely reduced the transaction cost of using money and it is therefore puzzling that S considers this a development little or no importance. S, moreover, goes beyond the evidence in saying that the ingots were not standardized in weight. The texts do not say that the ingots were weighed.

2. S writes of the Egyptian shaty “piece”: “It is regularly used as an item of account, not a medium of trade: that is, not ‘pieces’ but other items changed hands, bartered for each other and evaluated in terms of ‘pieces’.” (224-25) In fact, there is evidence for the circulation of shaty’s in texts of the Ramesside era (second half of the second millennium). In the Eighteenth Dynasty, a text (Papyrus Brooklyn 35.1453A) records the delivery of silver shaty’s to a woman at the meryet “quay, marketplace” (Condon 1984: 63-65). In Papyrus Boulaq 11 merchants pay for quantities of meat and wine with shaty’s (Castle 1992: 253, 257; Peet 1934). The texts do not say that the shaty’s were weighed or tested for quality.

3. S (41-2) discusses the Egyptian Hekanakht letters of about 2000 BCE, but he does not refer to the following significant detail. Copper coins may be indicated when Hekanakht sends to his agent “24 copper deben’s” for renting land. James (1984: 245) explains that “the letter says quite clearly ‘24 copper debens’, not ‘24 debens of copper’, which ought to signify 24 pieces of copper each weighing, one deben.”

4. S does not mention texts from the Assyrian trading station in Anatolia (earlier second millennium BCE) in which we sometimes find prices being expressed in terms of copper ingots, patallu and sadâlu. Thus, one Dakuku “owes 12 copper sadâlu’s as the price of donkey”. Dercksen (1996 60, n.179) notes that “quantity is expressed by simply giving the number of ingots instead of their weight [which] points to a more or less customary weight and size for this type” (emphasis added). I would add that use of the number of ingots also points to a standard quality.

5. S defines “coin” as follows: “[A] coin is an object, usually but not necessarily of metal, which circulates as a medium of trade, and whose value is guaranteed by the stamp of the issuing authority.” (223) He adds: “We may thus ignore without further discussions such items as spits, rings, and sealed bags of silver, which although they served many of the purposes that coins later served were not by themselves coins at all. They belong to the history of ‘primitive money’� “(223) S’s dismissal of sealed bags of silver is most puzzling and instead of ignoring these, he offers a brief discussion of their significance. (223-24) He concludes that

When silver was to be reused, a certain amount was given to the assayer in advance. Whatever the assayer did not use was sealed with a royal seal, obviating the need for weighing and assaying it again. The “sealed silver,” then, is ordinary silver sealed in a sack, not a coin.(223-24).

In my view, sealed bags provide evidence for widespread use of “coinage” in the ANE. The background is as follows. Cuneiform sources of the first half of the second millennium refer to sealed bags of silver (e.g. kaspum kankum). We hear of “(silver) in lumps-sealed in a bag” (CAD s.v. kanku a) and “x silver which is placed in its sealed bag” (CAD s.v. kanîku 2). There is also mention of silver “marked” (uddû) with its weight (CAD s.v. idû 4.a). Copper might also be packed into purses called (c)hurshianu (CAD s.v.; Dercksen 1996: 66).

The sealed bags might be transferred: “I needed (and asked you for in writing) ten shekels of silver under seal”; “x silver which PN gave to PN2 , and which is marked with the name of the merchant” (CAD s.v. �umu 1.e); “you have sent me silver which is not fit for business transactions�send me silver, (in) a sealed bag” (CAD s.v. kaniktu 2). Oppenheim (1969) makes brief mention of cuneiform sources of the first half of the second millennium that refer to sealed bags of silver deposited with persons who used the silver in various transactions. Most directly, the practice of transacting with sealed bags of silver is reflected in the call, in eighteenth-century contracts from Mesopotamia (the city of Larsa), for merchants to pay for palace-owned goods with “sealed silver” (Stol 1982: 150-51). The transactional use of sacks is ignored by S.²

Some years ago, in reflecting on these references, it occurred to me that in eleventh-century-CE Egypt and elsewhere in North Africa, in Talmudic times (400-500 CE) and earlier in Carthage and in Rome (the tesserae nummulariae), various coins and (probably) metal fragments were kept in purses labeled on the outside with the contents and sealed by governments or private merchants. In addition to keeping the coins “fresh”-that is, preserving their full weight-Udovitch (1979: 267), who studied the usage in medieval Islam, explains: “[T]hese packaged and labelled purses made settlement of accounts much more convenient . . . by obviating the need to weigh, array, and evaluate coins for every individual transaction. Significantly, most payments and transfers of funds were executed by the actual physical transfer of the purses.” We may assume that these purses circulated among the wealthier classes.

S responds as follows: “[Morris] Silver (126-27) obfuscates this point, going so far as to say that (medieval Islamic!) sealed purses ‘in short� were large denomination coins’. This is surely to broaden the definition of a coin far beyond reason.” (224, n. 9). S obtained this quote from my 1985 edition. In 1995 I wrote: “In short, the sealed purses functioned as large-denomination ‘coins’.”(161). The reason for the change in formulation is that numismatic specialists and antiquarians insisted that coins had to be made of metal. I was hammered on this, to an economist, unimportant detail. S’, properly broadened, definition of “coin” makes my original formulation perfectly appropriate. Under S’ definition a “nickel”, as he says, can be wooden and “a dollar bill would also count as a ‘coin’ (223, n. 3) The important point is that there is evidence to suggest that the kaspum kankum functioned as/were coins!

6. S does not mention evidence provided by Joannès (1989). Hammurabi (1792-1750) paid/rewarded Mari’s soldiers with (mysterious) shamshâtum “sun discs,” gold rings, silver of 5 or 10 shekels, and with small pieces of silver impressed with a seal. Joannès bases himself on ARMT 25, 815 and a letter (A-486+) to Zimri-Lim, the king of Mari. The key word here is kaniktum from kanakum “to mark a seal” (see CAD s.vv.). In the absence of (additional?) evidence for the use of kaniktum to make payments, Joannès suggests that these sealed silver objects may have been “medals.” Perhaps. On the other hand, perhaps they were coins. Indeed, as far as I am aware, the evidence for coinage is more ample than the evidence for “medals”! We have no information concerning whether and how Mari’s soldiers spent their small pieces of sealed silver.

7. Several bread-shaped ingots of the eighth century inscribed with the name of a king preceded by the Aramaic letter lamed have actually been found in the palace of Zinjirli, a north Syrian state located on the only good crossing of the Amanus mountains from east to west. The meaning of the possessive l is debated. One possibility is that it means “belonging to” in the sense of personal possession. Balmuth (1971: 3), however, suggests that it means “on behalf of” or “in the name of” (its meaning on coins of later times) and, therefore, that the inscription represents a royal guarantee of the metal. Any such guarantee might refer only to the quality of the metal or to both quality and weight. S responds as follows: “But there is no indication that this disk � was ever meant to be currency at all, and coins did not become current in this area until centuries later.” (91 n.52) Thus, S comes close to saying that the ingot could not be a coin because they had not been invented yet! S believes that the disks were designed for storage of wealth, not for making payments. Perhaps he has guessed right. The fact is, however, that there is simply no evidence beyond the inscribed ingots themselves.

As we will show next, S requires much more from the Near Eastern coinage evidence than from the Greek.

II. Greek Coinage Evidence

1.There is clear evidence of a double standard in S’s consideration of the Lydian evidence (93-6). The “Lydian” coins excavated in the Artemision at Ephesus are mostly dated to the seventh and earlier sixth centuries BCE. However, the dating remains controversial. Two of the pieces were dumps not coins. The significance of their inscriptions is still being debated. All but two of the ninety-three pieces conformed to the Milesian weight standard. There is no evidence that merchants would not have had to weigh them. There is no direct evidence that the coins circulated. The coins are made of the wrong metal, electrum instead of silver, gold, or copper. (Variation in the ratio of gold to silver would seem to call for quality testing.) In short, despite numerous opportunities to raise objections, S does not hesitate to call the finds in the Artemision, the “earliest datable coins“. (93; emphasis added)

S explains further: “The motivation behind the ‘cutting’ �of such coins must have been quite different from the motivation of the temple of Arbela in casting its ingots. Ingots of a pound or so are a convenient way in which to store silver, and they were probably made for that purpose. Small and minutely subdivided weights of electrum [as in the Ephesus hoard], however, were undoubtedly made for payment not storage.” (100) Possibly. However, there is evidence for the circulation of the Arbela ingots. A contract in which neither the temple nor its commercial agent is a party shows the silver being loaned out. The document originates some 50 miles from Arbela. On the other hand, no direct evidence is presented that the Ephesus coins circulated.

Contrast S’s evaluation of the Artemision coins with his view of the Cappadocian lead disks, which may date to the mid-second millennium. The “ornamentation” on (one side) of the disks is similar but not identical. The disks “vary irregularly in weight”. They are made of the “wrong metal”. There is no evidence of “circulation from place to place”. Scholars have expressed doubts that “such small bits of lead could have had much monetary value”. (225-26) “Nothing suggests that they are coins except their size and shape and the fact that they are made of metal�” (225) It would seem that ANE candidates for designation as early coins are always too large or too small or whatever.

2. S does not show that the Greece took its inspiration from Lydian coins. S explains: “The Greek coins were silver, not electrum�The change to silver indicates that coins, even if they had begun as a solution to the problem of the variability of electrum, had come to be appreciated as what they now were: a countable unit of value.”(104; emphasis added) Clearly, this terminology simply assumes an imitation and modification of Lydian coinage practices. Why, we need to know, would the Greeks be inspired by electrum coins?

3.There are hints that the Greeks had long been familiar with “primitive money” or even coinage. Greek traditions and legends place coinage much earlier than the sixth century. Thus, Plutarch (Theseus 25.3) wrote in the first century CE that Theseus, the legendary unifier and king of Attica, issued coins. In the second century CE, the scholar Pollux (9.83), claimed that coinage was invented by the even more shadowy Athenian figure Erichthonius, an early king. We find reports in ancient literary sources that Pheidon, king of Argos, introduced a silver coinage possibly as early as the eighth century (S 101-4).

No Hacksilber “cut-silver” hoards have been found inside Greece. However, an eighth century hoard was excavated in Eretria in Euboea. (The Taranto 1911 hoard is dated to c. 600.) Balmuth (1975: 296) suggests that “although many of these have been called silversmith’s hoards, the practicability of exchange by weight suggests that Hacksilber could simultaneously be both material for a jeweler and material for exchange.” S does not “believe there was ever an internal bullion economy in Greece” (195).³ However, Kim (2001) has presented evidence that money of weighed silver bullion was employed in the Greek world well before the introduction of coinage. There are references to the use of silver to pay fines in Solon’s time.

More importantly, S provides evidence consistent with bullion usage. In the eighth century, at Gortyn in Crete, the lebês “cauldron” was used to make payments. S explains that “it is hard to escape the impression that cauldrons, as inconvenient as they may seem to be, were functioning as a means of payment�in which fines could be assessed and deposits demanded.” (83, cf. 195) Actually, it is preposterous that physical cauldrons were used as means of payment. More reasonably, “cauldrons” might be the name for an ingot, perhaps stamped with the image of a cauldron. Mysterious monetary units are, after all, commonplace in the historical documents. Thus, a text from the ANE (Isin) records the purchase of an orchard for copper “hoes” ((c)haputu) inscribed with the name of the goddess Ninisina. Payments are also made in “sickles” and “axes”(CAD niggallu 1.b).

III. Alleged Revolutionary Effect of Coinage/Money

S’s central proposition is not documented in a credible manner. In this endeavor, S receives only limited mileage from his strained identification of coinage with money. Sometimes S claims for money/coin the effects of Greek economic growth. In other instances, he admits that no revolution occurred. The quotations cited below illustrate his difficulties.

1. “The conceptual revolution that identified coins with wealth turned money into an item of which one could never have too much, or, indeed, enough.” (175) What then of the Assyrian merchants of the early second millennium BCE whose wives scolded them “You love only money, and you hate your own life!” (Larsen 1982: 42). More to the point, what of Solon (Fragment 13.43-45. 47-48,71-73 West):

One hastens after one thing, another after something else; one man, desiring to bring home profit, wanders over the fishy sea in ships�another, whose concern is the curved plow, cleaves the thickly wooded land and slaves away for a year�but no limit of wealth [ploutou d'ouden terma] is clearly laid down for men; for those of us who now have the greatest livelihood [pleiston�bion] have twice the eagerness [diplasion specdousi]; who can satisfy [koreseien] all? (Balot 2001: 90)

Presumably this view originates in the late archaic period-i.e., before the Greeks adopted coinage. In any event, Solon does not link human acquisitiveness with coinage or money.

2. “To the extent, then, that Homeric society had distinguished prestige goods from nonprestige goods, money subverted the distinction: money could buy anything and could be gotten in exchange for anything. It follows that even a peasant or a shopkeeper could amass enough money to buy the most prestigious goods; and it followed from this that the possession of those goods, which is now open to everybody, no longer distinguished the best from the worst.” (117)

3. “The history of the late archaic age in Greece is the story of the crumbling of oligarchies. This development was already underway before coinage had been invented�Nevertheless, it is more than probable that money and the market had their share in continuing the process and in changing the entire concept of oligarchy” (120).

4. An (alleged) trend from socially embedded transactions to impersonal economics should not be attributed to the adoption of coinage.

There is no doubt that economic transactions tended, as Greek society developed from the archaic age to the classical and the Hellenistic, to be more a matter of immediate mutual economic benefit and less a form of discharging social obligations. The invention of coinage certainly facilitated this change, which may, however, have been propelled more by simple population growth than by any technological or cultural development. (33)

5. “The agora grew up in the Kerameikos, the potters quarter, and excavations have found evidence of potters’ waste as far back as 1000 B.C.E., but there are not other signs of commercial or industrial activity before the growth of the agora itself [in the sixth century].” (113) “We cannot � prove that there was no retail trade before coins were invented; but what we have seen suggests that if there was any, there was not much”. (115) The latter suggestion, however, does not depend so much on “what we have seen” as on what we have not, namely the archaic agora! “The place in which Athenians had previously congregated was hardly remembered by the Athenians and has not been securely identified to this day” (113).

In the end, S offers a more balanced appraisal. The various participants “were all making a profit, and they were doing it in a way that would have been a good deal more difficult before the invention of coinage.” (115) “Money, we may reiterate, did not create trade, but it marked the beginning of a new age of commerce in Greece.” (122)

6. “Without money, the great temples, the dramatic festivals of Athens, its navy, and its democracy would have taken a very different form, if they had come to exist at all.” (197) This is simply a reach.

7. “Merkelbach’s observation that a bordello was hardly conceivable before the invention of money is a plausible one, though the ‘money’ involved need not have been coins: the weighed silver of the Levant would also have been sufficient.” (160) “Merkelbach’s observation” is “plausible” only because he does not identify money with coinage. How did Greeks pay for sexual services before the (alleged) “invention” of coinage/money in the sixth century? S does not tell us.

8. “The ancient Greeks, even when money had become the universal medium of exchange, still considered the exchange of labor for money to be the exceptional case�” (162) No revolution in the labor market.

9. “In sum, it appears that money never truly transformed Greek agriculture.”(172)

S, however, underestimates the market orientation of Greek agriculture in the later archaic period. Citing Hesiod (Works and Days 618-94), S suggests that “Peasants might try to change an agricultural surplus into a more lasting form of wealth by sailing abroad during the seasons when the farm could be left alone.” (89) What exactly was the “more lasting form of wealth” in these days (allegedly) before money/coin? With respect to S’ “agricultural surplus,” Redfield 2003: 168) points out that Hesiod advises “peasants” to “leave the greater part, and load as cargo the lesser” (Works and Days 690). Hesiod it seems can actually imagine farming entirely for export, although he is against it.” Moreover, Hesiod’s comment that “wealth means life to poor mortals” indicates an appreciation of production for the market.

IV. Peripheral Contributions

Apart from his central argument, S makes a number of rather interesting and useful observations. Some examples follow.

“When the [Mycenaean] palaces had been burned and their far-flung bureaucracy dispersed, there will have been more need for exchange. The Homeric heroes did indeed have to weigh the value of a slave against the value of a tripod; if this seems to us a step toward the concept of money, it is not for that reason a sign of an expanding economy.” (71) Thus, the Homeric era, can be viewed and an “Intermediate Period” of a type familiar in Egyptian economic history.

Speaking of the marketplace in Athen, S notes:

These merchandises were not mixed: not only was there no one ‘general store’ that sold them all, but there was not even a single place where one could ‘do the shopping’. Each merchandise had its own part of the agora, and a person would speak of being ‘among the fish’ or ‘among the banks’.”(167)

Or even, citing Aristophanes, “among the tragedies”! (167, n. 19)

S (123) cites Aristophanes’ joke that a politician could win public support by lowering the price of sardines.

S takes up private enterprise in the coinage business:

It might, in theory, have happened that coining would have become a form of business, in which private individuals turned silver into coins that would have been accepted by the reputation of the coiner�.It did not happen in Greece. Once coinage was generally adopted in Greek cities, the coining of money was normally a state monopoly. (179)

By contrast, would suggest, some of the inscriptions on the coins from the Artemision coins seem to be personal names, which leaves open the possibility that the issuers were private individuals.

Large business loans were made at Athens. “It is true, however, that large loans at Athens were, as far we can tell, never designed to be paid off in drips and drabs out of one’s regular income.” (245)

There are also some rather unfortunate observations. “Behind the [Greek] prejudice [against merchants] though hardly ever explicitly expressed, lies a real paradox, namely, the syllogism that: (a) a trade should be fair; (b) if a trade is fair, both sides should remain with the same value; whence it follows that (c) if a person can increase his capital by trade, he is cheating someone.” (177) It should be needless to say that there is no “real paradox”. An uncoerced exchange benefits both parties. Unless each contractor views his postexchange position to be superior to his preexchange position, exchange will not take place. Contrary to the Marxist perspective, exchange is productive. Specifically, trade rearranges an existing stock of goods in a way that enables each participant to become better off as measured relative to his own values at the time of deciding to trade. The creative nature of trade is little appreciated by scholars untrained in basic economic principles. S (177, n. 7) compounds the problem by minimizing the contribution of the middleman in “making a market”. Later, S. redeems himself by crediting the obolostatês “obol weigher” for smoothing the function of the marketplace by “redistributing-for a fee-the coins that circulated in the market so that any seller could count on finding enough coins to start a day’s business…”. (186)

Concluding Remark

Not surprisingly, S fails to demonstrate his thesis that coin=money revolutionized Greek economy and society. In my judgment, it is not nearly enough to cite the obvious advantages of coins in retail trade and to note that a Greek household might now express the entirety of its possessions in terms of money. With respect to the invention of coinage, the communis opinio has long been that it first appeared in the Greek world, not in the Near East. S, to his credit, does explore the evidence for coinage in the Near East. However, he omits or misrepresents much and treats the remainder in an unbalanced manner. S has a tendency to make definitive statements not supported by evidence. Outside his central argument, S has many worthwhile things to say. The latter insights are sufficient to justify a favorable evaluation of the book.

Notes1. In Genesis 23.16, Abraham “weighed” for Ephron’s field the sum of 400 shekels of silver kesep ‘ôber lassôcher. The latter phrase is usually translated “current money of the merchant,” but the literal meaning is “silver passing for the merchant”. The expression makes us focus on the kind of silver that would be employed in commerce. Hurowitz (1986: 290, n.3), taking note of the, Old Assyrian usage kaspum asshumi PN (personal name) equlam ittiq “silver will travel overland to the name of PN”-concludes that the silver “must have been of a standard, recognized quality.” There is no mention in Genesis of a test of the quality of the metal. Hence, it seems reasonable that a merchant’s stamp or seal guaranteed the silver. S (91, n. 50) rejects this interpretation. S .(228, n. 37) is correct in insisting that the silver was weighed.

2. Despite the dangers, some biblical evidence should be noted. In 2 Kings 12.10-12 we read that in the ninth century under King Jehoash: a box with a hole bored in it was set up in the temple for the collection of silver [presumably silver pieces] for a repairs fund; at a certain point the Temple officers removed the silver from the box and “tied it up”/”bagged it” [warrasuru]; then the silver was counted [wayyimnu]; and then the “measured”/”regulated” [metukkan] silver was given to contractors who delivered it to various workers at the Temple who used it to purchase timber and stone. The text does not say that the sacks were opened in order to make payments. Thus, expressing all due caution, the most direct understanding is that the sacks circulated outside the Temple.

3.There is some reason to believe that terms originally meaning “weigh” came to have the meaning “pay” The Greek material provides a possible example of this kind of development in meaning. A law of Solon states “Silver is to be stasimon at however much the lender may choose” (Kroll 2001: 78; Schaps 2001: 97). The orator Lysias (later fifth-earlier fourth century BCE) explains “This stasimon, my good man, is not a matter of placing in a balance but of exacting interest at whatever rate one may choose” (10.18). Schaps (2001: 98) concedes that stasis may refer to weighing but he opposes Kroll’s interpretation of Lysias as referring to an obsolete procedure, the weighing of silver on a scale: “The claim hinges on the presumption that stasimon ‘properly’ should mean ‘weighable’; but there are no parallels for such a meaning.” What then does stastimon mean in Solon’s law? According to Schaps (2001: 98) the word means “nothing more than ‘is to be paid’.”

In fact, there are no other examples of the use of stasimos in the meanings “weighing” (Kroll) or “paying” (Schaps). What is clear is that “There is an absolute connection between the adjective stasimos and the noun stasis, both derived from the verb histêmi ‘to stand up, to cause to stand up” (David Tandy personal correspondence dated March 2, 2004; LSJ s.v. histêmi). The verb histêmi is well attested in the meaning “to weigh”.

In classical Athens, long after the introduction of coins, we find the term obolostateô “weigh obols” in the meaning “making small loans” (LSJ s.v.). There is evidence here of an evolution from “weighing” to “paying”.

AbbreviationsCAD: Gelb et al., The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute (University of Chicago)

LSJ: Lidell, Scott, Jones, Greek-English Lexicon

ReferencesArchi, Alfonso. (1993), “Trade and Administrative Practice: The Case of Ebla.” Altorientalische Forschungen, 20, 43-58.

Balmuth, Miriam S. (1971). “Remarks on the Appearance of the Earliest Coins.” In David G. Mitten et al.(eds.), Studies Presented to George M.A. Hanfmann. Cambridge, Mass.: Fogg Art Museum, 1-7.

Balmuth, Miriam S. (1975). “The Critical Moment: The Transition from Currency to Coinage in the Eastern Mediterranean.” World Archaeology, 6, 293-98.

Balmuth, Miriam S. (ed.)(2001). Hacksilber to Coinage: New Insights into the Monetary History of the Near East and Greece. New York: American Numismatic Society.

Balot, Ryan K. (2001). Greed and Injustice in Classical Athens. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Castle, Edward W. (1992). “Shipping and Trade in Ramesside Egypt.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 35,239-77.

Condon, Virginia. (1984). “Two Account Papyri of the Late Eighteenth Dynasty (Brooklyn 35.1453A and B).” Revue d’Égyptologie, 35, 57-82.

Dercksen, Jan Gerrit. (1996). The Old Assyrian Copper Trade in Anatolia. Leiden: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Instituut te Istanbul.

Foster, Benjamin R. (1977). “Commercial Activity in Sargonic Mesopotamia.” Iraq, 39, 31-44.

Gelb, I.J. et al. (eds.) (1956-). The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago. Locust Valley, N.Y.: Augustin.

Hallo, William W. (1958). “Contributions to Neo-Sumerian.” Hebrew Union College Annual, 29, 69-107.

Hurowitz (Avigdor), Victor. (1986). “Another Fiscal Practice in the Ancient Near East: 2 Kings 12:5-17 and a Letter to Esarhaddon (LAS 277).” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 45, 289-94.

James, T.G.H. (1984). Pharaoh’s People. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Joannès, F. (1989). “108) Médailles d’argent d’Hammurabi?”. Nouvelles Assyriologiques Brèves et Utilitaires, (no4 Décembre), 80-1.

Kim, Henry S. (2001). “Archaic Coinage as Evidence for the Use of Money.” In Andrew Meadows and Kirsty Shipton (eds.), Money and Its Uses in the Ancient Greek World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 7-21.

Kroll, John H. (2001). “Observations on Monetary Instruments in Pre-Coinage Greece.” In Balmuth (ed.), Hacksilber to Coinage, 77-91.

Larsen, Mogens Trolle (1982). “Caravans and Trade in Ancient Mesopotamia and Asia Minor.” Bulletin of the Society of Mesopotamian Studies, 4, 33-45.

Liddell, Henry George, and Robert Scott. (1968). A Greek-English Lexicon. Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie, rev. ed. London: Oxford University Press.

Lipinski, Edward. (1979a). “Les temples neo-assyriens et les origines du monnayage.” In Edward Lipinski (ed.), State and Temple Economy in Ancient Mesopotamia, II. Leiden: Brill, 565-88.

Malamat, A. (1998). Man and the Bible. Leiden: Brill.

Oppenheim, A. Leo. (1969). “Review of R. Bogaert.” Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 12, 198-99.

Peet, Thomas Eric. (1934). “Unit of Value �’ty in Papyrus Bulaq 11. In Mélanges Maspero, Vol. 1, Fasc 1. Cairo: Institut Française d’Archaéologie Orientale du Caire, 185-99.

Redfield, James M. (2003). The Locrian Maidens: Love and Death in Greek Italy. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

Schaps, David M. (2001). “The Conceptual Prehistory of Money and its Impact on the Greek Economy.” In Balmuth (ed.), Hacksilber to Coinage, 93-103.

Silver, Morris. (1985), Economic Structures of the Ancient Near East. Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books.

Silver, Morris. (1995). Economic Structures of Antiquity. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press.

Stol, M. (1982). “State and Private Business in the Land of Larsa.” Journal of Cuneiform Studies, 34, 127-230.

Udovitch, Abraham L. (1979). “Bankers Without Banks: Commerce, Banking, and Society in the Islamic World in the Middle Ages.” Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, University of California, Los Angeles, The Dawn of Modern Banking. New Haven. Conn.: Yale University Press, 255-74.

___________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________
Morris Silver is Professor Emeritus of Economics in the City College of the City University of New York. His most recent publications about ancient economies are Taking Ancient Mythology Economically (Leiden: Brill, 1992) and Economic Structures of Antiquity (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1995). “Modern Ancients” is forthcoming in Rollinger and Ulf (eds.), Commerce and Monetary Systems in the Ancient World , Fifth Annual Melammu Conference 2002. Professor Silver maintains a website on “Ancient Economies” at http://sondmor.tripod.com/index-html.

Postscript to the Review of Schaps (added May 17, 2004; revised September 3, 2004)

1. The Weighing Problem

My review brushed aside the question of the weighing of precious metals. In deference to the communis opinio, I wished to consider only Near Eastern examples in which, contrary to Schaps, weighing was absent or at least undocumented. I will now state my evolving position more fully and accurately. It is quite true that Near Eastern texts involving payment in precious metals often (usually?) include the technical term “to weigh out”. However, the references to weighing are consistent with the view that precious metal coins in the ancient Near East and Greece were guaranteed for quality, not for weight. The weighing of metal in making payments does not exclude the possibility that the weighed precious metal had been formed into a coin.

Kraay (1964: 90-1), has discussed this issue in the context of ancient Greek coinage:

It is often claimed that coins obviated the need for weighing in each transaction, and this is no doubt true of those places which produced a range and quantity of small denominations sufficient to supply the needs of retail trade; but we have seen that such places were very few in the period under discussion. Elsewhere, irregularity of weight, variety of standard, the hazards of wear, clipping or plating must surely required the continuation of weighing in almost every transaction.

Wallace (1987: 388) adds the observation that if one could make payments merely by handing over the “requisite number of coins, surely the temptation to shave off precious metal would sometimes have proved irresistible”. He concludes that Greek coins were weighed at each transaction and in this sense, they were no more convenient than bullion. Wallace’s position seems to find support in Nikophon’s law on coinage of 375/4, found inscribed in the Agora. The Dokimastes “Validator” was very much involved in appraising the quality of the coins circulating in the marketplace. However, according to Figueira (1998: 545): “The purview of the Dokimastes does not seem to have extended to an examination of coins for their weight. Such calculations may have been left to negotiations between buyers and sellers.” Kletter (2004: 209) asserts, citing Kroll (1991: 77), that coinage “made weighing in transaction obsolete”. However, neither Kletter (nor Kroll) provide evidence that bullion coins (not token coins) were merely counted and not weighed in making payments. In a later article, Kroll (1998: 228, n. 18) mentions epigraphical references assembled by Picard and Le Rider attesting to the counting as opposed to weighing of coins. He explains that “All of this evidence is 4th century and later, but there is no reason to suspect that silver coins were not also counted out in the archaic period. Since they passed at a value that was slightly higher than their intrinsic bullion value (see below), there was no point in weighing them as bullion.” Kroll suggests that Kraay’s claim that coins were weighed in almost every transaction “was in the context of coins used in foreign trade. So long as a coinage had legal tender status�within a city or kingdom, such bad or suspect coins as Kraay mentions could usually be recognized, as they are today, by autopsy, and could be protected against by nonacceptance. Only suspect pieces might be weighed, and even then the weighing was a means of testing authenticity, not of determining value” (emphasis added). This is rather puzzling. How were the coins able to pass at a value higher than their bullion content? Kroll’s answer seems to be that they were legal tender. However, coins that are legal tender must be accepted by sellers under penalty of law. Of course, there would be no point to weighing them!

Speaking of the ancient Near East, Vargyas (2002: 113) maintains that “it is well known that money, whether coins or scrap silver, was weighed until the end of cuneiform documentation.� Coins were considered bullion and were weighed on a balance.” .” Powell (1996 227), without citing really concrete evidence, maintains that “Weighing of coined money-particularly high-value money like silver and gold-has probably always been more ubiquitous than generally thought�”

When seen in the light of the above discussion, Schaps’ argument against Near Eastern coinage turns out to be weaker than I stated in my review. Schaps maintained: “The silver of the Near East had never been coined; it was weighed at each transaction, and the scale was an essential accessory to every sale.”(49) If I understand him correctly, Schaps is saying that weighing excludes coinage. However, the weighing of Near Eastern precious metal, even “at each transaction,” does not mean that the metal had not been formed into a coin. Neither, for that matter, would weighing be an argument against Greek coinage! Let me hasten to add that none of this proves that Near Eastern and Greek coins were invariably or even typically weighed. For newer coins, the visual inspection intrinsic in every transaction should have sufficed. In the case of older coins, especially those of large denominations, transactors would have borne the cost of weighing the metal. The actual frequency of coin-weighing is uncertain. Let me emphasize, as I stated in the review, that the sealed sacks (kaspum kankum) would not be weighed.

2.More on the Weighing into Paying Problem

A small minority (fifteen) of the Ur III sale contracts studied by Steinkeller (1989: 92) refer to the weighing of silver by a “specially designated person,” usually a smith or a merchant. Roughly, the same number of texts refer to “weighing out” of silver by the buyer. (The vast majority of texts make no mention of weighing and make no reference to the assaying/testing of the silver transferred.) Two of the texts (7 and 113) are of special interest because they mention “weighing out” by the buyer and that the silver was “weighed out” by a specially designated person. Why should weighing of the same silver by two distinct individuals, buyer and smith or merchant, be mentioned in the same transaction? In text 113 Steinkeller (1989: 309) implictly answers this question by translating the weighing by the buyer as “paid”. I suspect that this translation is correct for all the texts that mention weighing of silver by the buyer. This still leaves open the question of why there are references to weighing of silver by a specially designated person.

The weigher of silver was a neutral party to the transaction. This is clearly demonstrated by no. 121: because PN, the goldsmith, acted as the guarantor in this sale and thus represented the seller, he could not weigh out the silver. For that reason weighing had to be done by someone else, in this case his son, who most likely was an apprentice goldsmith. This example also proves that a qualified specialist was required for this operation. (Steinkeller 1989: 94)

The first problem with this explanation is that the “required” specialist is mentioned in only 15 of nearly 150 texts. Second, the son of a participant in a transaction would hardly be seen as a “neutral party”. We must look elsewhere for an explanation. My proposal is that the specially designated individual who “weighed” the silver was acting for an absent buyer and/or was the buyer’s banker. Moreover, the agent or banker did not literally weigh the silver, he paid it.

In classical Athens, long after the introduction of coins, we find the term obolostateô “weigh obols” in the meaning “making small loans” (LSJ s.v.). The obolostatês “obol weigher” is actually an “obol lender”. How is this pairing of (literal) meaning and function to be explained? One possibility is that the “obol weigher” actually counted coins in making his loans. We would then understand that “weigh” had come to mean “pay”. That is, “weigh” no longer refers to placing ingots of precious metals on scales. The implication of such an evolution in meaning is that ancient texts mentioning the “weighing” of exchange media should be interpreted with due caution. The other main possibility is that the “obol weigher” actually weighed coins in making his loans. That is, the title obolostatês is not vestigial. This would be consistent with the view, summarized above, that issuers of ancient Greek coins guaranteed the quality of the metal, not their weight.

ReferencesFigueira, Thomas. (1998). The Power of Money: Coinage and Politics in the Athenian Empire. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Kletter, Raz. (2004). “Coinage before Coins? A Response?”. Levant, 36, 207-210).

Kraay, Colin M. (1964). “Hoards, Small Change and the Origins of Coinage.” Journal of Hellenic Studies, 84. 76-91.

Kroll, John H. (1998). “Silver in Solon’s Laws.” In Richard Ashton and Silvia Hurter (eds.), Studies in Greek Numismatics in Memory of Martin Jessop Price. London: Spink, 225-32.

Steinkeller, Piotr. (1989). Sale Documents of the Ur-III Period. Stuttgart: Steiner.

Vargyas, Péter. (2002). “Sennacherib’s Alleged Half-Shekel Coins.” Journal of Near Eastern Studies, 61, 111-15.

Wallace, Robert W. (1987). “The Origin of the Electrum Coinage.” American Journal of Archaeology, 91, 385-97.

James P. Allen,

Copyright EH.Net 2004

James P. Allen*, The Heqanakht Papyri, New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2002 [Published 02/2004]. xvii + 297pp. + Plate 57 + CD. $50 (cloth), ISBN: 1-58839-070-5

Reviewed for EH.NET by Morris Silver, Professor Emeritus of Economics, Department of Economics, City College of the City University of New York

I. Introduction

The economic historian Karl Polanyi argued that markets became important only in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the present era. Instead of market-determined prices, the ruler (as representative of the gods) declared simple quantitative equivalencies to allow grain, oil, wine, and wool to be substituted for each other. A few main staples were received and given out at the palace gate (Polanyi 1981: 61, 134). Polanyi continues to enjoy major support. His influence becomes obvious in discussions of the economic mentality of ancient man, of the use of money/coinage and, especially, in the assertion that antiquity lacked markets for land and labor power.

When subjected to challenge, the validity of one or another of Polanyi’s positions is often shifted to times and places for which data is typically scarce and ambiguous, above all to Pharaonic Egypt. The latter is allegedly the epitome of a redistributional society. According to the Egyptologist Jacob J. Janssen (1982: 253) this means that “the surplus of peasant households was collected by the authorities, state and temple, in order to be redistributed among particular sections of society: officials, priests, the army, necropolis workmen, and so on”. However, Janssen (1975: 131, 185) maintains that the evidence is so scanty that “for the present, a study of the redistributional system in all its aspects seems the only possibility”.

The great value of the Heqanakht papyri is that they open a window to the kind of world with which economic historians are familiar. Private property, “economic man,” money and coinage and markets for land and labor-power become visible, however dimly. For these glimpses, economic historians are greatly indebted to Egyptologist James P. Allen (A) and his predecessors for their monumental efforts. After a brief review of the background of the Heqanakht papyri attention is turned to the main economic features of the Papyri as revealed in A’s translations (in Part I “The Texts”) and his Chapter 8 “Economics” (in Part II “Commentary”). These features are placed in the context of prevailing perspectives and additional relevant evidence is cited when necessary. Technical matters primarily of interest to Egyptologists are not discussed in this review.¹

II. Background of the Heqanakht papyri

The Heqanakht papyri, part of the permanent collection of the Metropolitan Museum of Art are currently on display in its Egyptian galleries. They consist of five complete letters, four complete accounts, and four or five fragments. The papyri were discovered in the Museum’s Theban expedition of 1921-22 in the tomb of one Meseh. Each of the complete documents was found folded; two were tied with string and sealed with a lump of clay impressed with the same stamp. The papyri are dated to the early Middle Kingdom-i.e. to about 2000 B.C.E.

A improved on the previous readings of the text by means of examinations under various lighting conditions with the aid of a microscope and by the application of computer technology.

III. Economics

1. “Economic Man”

According to Polanyi, “economic solipsism” is an outstanding feature of the market mentality. This is the view that commercial activity is “natural” to men and that markets would thus come into being unless prohibited by the government or other external forces (Polanyi 1981: 14-15). Polanyi’s main thrust anticipates classical scholars such as Moses Finley (1973, 1985) and Paul Millett (1991: especially 165-71), who maintain that, unlike modern economic man, ancient man was motivated primarily by considerations of status and communal solidarity. The postulate of wealth-maximizing used by contemporary economists is said to be utterly inappropriate to the “irrational,” that is, nonutilitarian, ancients.

It is not easy to find historical evidence casting direct light on motives, whether of status or profit. However, as A (142) points out, the Heqanakht letters deal almost entirely with economic matters and therefore “they offer unparalleled insights into the economic life of a moderately well-to-do Egyptian family at the beginning of the Middle Kingdom”. Despite obscurities in meaning, it is clear that Heqanakht does not possess the antimarket mentality alleged by Polanyi and Finley. He calculates and makes plans concerning: the amount and types of land (watered vs. unwatered) to put under cultivation, crop rotations (flax vs. barley vs. emmer), how to pay for rented land, how much to pay out in salaries and he keeps and consults accounts of his enterprise. It is abundantly obvious that Heqanakht was very much concerned (obsessed?) with running his enterprise in a manner that would make a profit and augment his wealth. There is little or no reason to believe, moreover, that his objective in this endeavor is to increase his own or his family’s consumption of goods and services (cf. Baer 1963: 16-17).

Hekanakht like the merchants (sheweteyew) of Papyrus Lansing (dating to the second half of the second millennium) who busied themselves in “supplying him who has not” possessed the “marketing mind,” said by Polanyi (1981: 5) to be “peculiar to conditions of life under the type of economy the nineteenth century created in all industrial societies.” Let us also mention the warnings of Ankhsheshonqi (Papyrus British Museum 10508) that “the shewetey will charge for the water one drinks in his house” (16.5) and that “he disregards friendship to get his share” (28.4) (Allam 1998: 152).²

2. Private Landed Property

The Egyptologist Menu (2001: 424) states that “The soil of Egypt is the exclusive property of the king.” This assertion is, however, the product of a “model”, not of evidence. Indeed, Menu (2001: 425) mentions fields termed nemehew “privately owned”. Further, when, in the fourteenth century BCE, Akhenaten constructed the city of Amarna the ruler did not claim (in his “Earlier Proclamation”) that the land, like the rest in Egypt, was his “exclusive property”. Instead, Akhenaten justified his claim by noting simply that the territory was not the property of a deity or ruler and “not the property of any people to do business of theirs with it.” In short, the land was unused and Akhenaten had found it “widowed”/”abandoned” (Murnane and van Siclen 1993: 37-8).

The evidence provided by Heqanakht is not voluminous but it is to the point. Not only does Heqanakht refer three times to “my land”. (A: 149) but the entire tenor of his communications reveals his unquestioned power over the land he cultivates. The only reference to the state is that Heqanakht budgets some grain for the payment of taxes which were assessed on his livestock.³

3. Grain Market

Heqanakht’s letters attest to grain sales. Hekanakht (1.4-5) anticipates using cash proceeds from the sale of emmer for renting land. If this amount is not sufficient, he instructs his family, to use proceeds from the sale of cloth (1.6).

The Papyri also signal the making of grain loans in Heqanakht’s mention mentions of “what is to be collected from the things (debts) which are in Perhaa”(1. vo. 17) and tjabet “grain loan” in Fr