Economic attitudes on political integration stance.
national and European positions of France and the United Kingdom in the post World War Two world. Within this context, their economic security and underlying political values will provide basis for the analysis and comparison of each country’s willingness to accept European integration and co-operation. Intrinsically linked to the economic problems and advantages of this European integration are political factors influencing the politicians who made the decisions in this immediate post war period. The purpose of this essay is to examine which causes appeared most prominently in France and Britain’s willingness (and unwillingness respectively) to join, through the views of a number of leading politicians of the time. To be discussed is whether in fact economic reasons for joining the process were positive or negative in following the political reasons. It is economic integration in relation to the politics of Europe that will be considered because essentially, that was the most successful part of the integration of Europe, as it still continues today.
I will use speeches by Winston Churchill, a main political figure in the UK to explore the reluctance of Britons to enter into economic integration. To support and counter arguments I will use secondary sources and further commentary by other politicians of the time. I will do the same for prominent figures such as Monnet in French politics.
The basis of the argument for the UK will be grounded in Britain’s negative political and economic bias towards Europe, particularly the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The basis for the French argument will be that she was primarily concerned in a positive manner with the economics of the European integration program offered by the European Coal and Steel Community.
A brief history of each country’s position.
Both France and Britain’s economies were damaged after the Second World War; it had caused need for higher spending in sectors of the economy which in normal peace time would be much lower[1]. However, the British economy compared with the other states in Western Europe, appeared to emerge from the War in a somewhat less desperate position. During the early 1950s, 50% of world trade was made in sterling transactions[2] in addition to Britain having her Empire to advantageously trade with. She had not been occupied by German forces during the war and had materialised a stronger relationship with the United States of America through the Allied partnership. France on the other hand had been occupied by German forces and required massive amounts of recuperation after the war. Her economy could not depend so much on colonial trading, and the Rhine area was particularly important to both France and Germany. So the use of this economic tool was in effect a direct benefit to France.
Immediately after the war and in the period up until the creation of the ECSC, the French and British governments both debated and negotiated the contentious issue of European integration. Despite consensus on the need for some form of integration, the origins of each country’s attitude are somewhat different.
The United Kingdom.
When in opposition, Winston Churchill’s (Conservative) main concern with regards to European unity appeared to be political. His drive, as with many other politicians in Europe, was to restore peace. In numerous speeches, he clearly advocated unity in order to achieve this aim. In the House of Commons in 1950 (from the opposition) he said “…we should do all in our power to encourage and promote Franco-German reconciliation as an approach to unity…”[3] This suggests that politics takes the forefront of the stage for Churchill and that he is significantly pro-integration (at this time) for these political reasons. The advantages concerning Churchill are primarily the effects that European unity would have on the Franco-German relationship, German defence and the recuperation of Germany[4]. His speech in the House of Commons in March 1950 does little to suggest that Churchill, from the opposition, is concerned with the positive effects of integrated economics of the unity.
Further to the notion that Churchill was an advocate of political concerns over economic integration is evident in his leadership when in power. Even though the Conservative government of 1951 privatised steel (following the Labour governments’ nationalisation of steel) he did not effectively move Britain any closer to the European integration process. This economic barrier being lifted demonstrates that economic factors were less persuasive for Britain towards Europe. Again in line with political considerations of European integration, Ian Wood comments that Churchill informed the Council of Europe that Britain would not accept any supranational body which had power over its internal mechanisms[5].
A second voice in the House of Commons – that of the equally influential Foreign Secretary of the Labour government – Ernest Bevin counters this assertion with his acknowledgement that “…we are turning to a constructive concept dealing with economic development at the same time.”[6] Taking this comment, it would seem that the House was debating both economic and political factors of joining the European integration process, but where the economic factors were not viewed upon as particularly positive. Bevin’s comment, rather suggests that the economic benefits did not weigh against the political disadvantages at that time.
In addition to Britain’s national economic concerns in the post war period,
is the relationship that Britain maintained with her colonies. The colonial exports and the lack of economic trade barriers that she continued after the war meant that Britain could keep an income that other European states had ceased to have. Members of the House consistently argued that Britain could not drift away from the Commonwealth of exclusive sources. One MP, Mr Ridsdale for Harwich, (Conservative) pointed out that Britain could not afford to retreat into smaller productive means[7]. This economic reason was negatively used in politic; Ridsdale, as one example, used the comparison of the economic security that had been built up over the colonial period to the economic security that those in favour of integration on the continent were trying to create. He belittled the idea of creating a European force under economic terms by labelling it a “…little Europe in an already divided Europe.”[8]
Essentially, Britain had economic reasons that were embedded in political factors for not joining the European integration process so favourably. Because the economic needs of Britain did not match the politics of the European integration process, Britain was more reluctant to join in. So the economic factors of British politics in relation to both domestic and international concerns were used negatively to avoid joining the European integration process.
France.
The attitude of France towards European integration was significantly and somewhat noticeably different. She was directly the cause of integration proposals; to unite her with Germany so war could no longer be an option for solving conflict of interests. Economical factors of integration are viewed more positively by French politicians.
Jean Monnet – considered one of the Founding Fathers of European unity – saw European integration in a predominantly political light, with economics as a positive way to accomplish that which he aimed to solve. Writing in 1962, Monnet reflected that de Gaulle’s ‘concert of Europe’ notion was a positive idea, but suggests that integration should go much further than that[9]. This is evidence that economic factors were merely a way to conceptualise the political ties that would be created in the link between European countries.
Further contributing to the impression that French politicians were concerned with economics as a positive secondary to political benefits is the decolonisation of its colonies. French colonies (mostly on the African continent) were dramatically lost in a series of colonial power struggles after the Second World War. This demonstrated the French ability to continue with positive economic ambitions with European integration and continue to push forward political mergence. Holding onto the colonies was evidently not a constructive mechanism because by the end of their colonial wars, as Robert Paxton points out, the United States was supplying most of France’s war materials[10]. By 1953, France’s gross national income had less than 5 percent from exports to its remaining French territories overseas, while Britain remained much higher with 9 percent to the commonwealth[11]. So France took the economics of this positively and pushed for integration with Germany further.
Outside the two.
In 1957 the former Italian Foreign Trade Minister, Ugo La Malfo pinned the need for European integration down to economic factors which would lead to political co-operation. He said that in order to stop the impoverishment of the people of Europe, a common market must be created to provide Europe with a vast, “powerful productive unit.”[12] He also noted the need for this because “….the rhythm of our economic progress is decidedly slower than that of the great powers.”[13] These comments make it obvious that there was leaning in Italian politics towards European integration for economic necessity.
From inside the European Coal and Steel Community, Paul Delouvrier commented in 1957 that he felt the British should see that the Commonwealth was no longer anything more than “…an old boys’ association which meets every year in a different town.”[14] This is a criticism of the British attitude towards choosing economic ties with the commonwealth over Europe, and has the underlying disapproval of its seeming political stagnation. It accuses the United Kingdom of being a partaker in a talking shop; one that it is head of, the Commonwealth.
Even within the Six (France, Germany, Italy and the Benelux[15] countries), there was criticism that their European integration policies were embedded in the political. Delouvrier comments that the representatives in Brussels were not “unaware” of important monetary problems, but instead were more concerned with “…their ministerial political side [coming] uppermost.”[16] So it can be deduced by this that countries within the economic structures of European integration – notably France for this essay – went along with the economics of the set up positively because it satisfied their political motions and ideas.
Summary.
To summarise the main points made in argument that France and Britain viewed the economic factors differently in order to suit their political stance, France essentially used economics for beneficial arguments toward European integration, whereas Britain did not. Churchill’s enthusiasm for integration then unwillingness to push the United Kingdom to join when he was in power in 1951 demonstrates that the economic benefits for Britain were not taken as a convincing factor. Bevin noted also that economic factors played a secondary role to the political factors of integration; the joining of French and German Coal and Steel was a means to the ends of peace. The United Kingdom’s colonial economic trading was an economic factor that was used in discussion to dissuade approval of the economic benefits proposed by European integration.
As for France, the case was different. Monnet’s vision of integration was predominantly political; peace and influence in the global sphere. Prosperity was again merely a means to these ends, the same as Bevin noted. However the attitude towards these means was much more positive than that of Britain. Unlike the United Kingdom’s colonial ties, France’s were in tatters and this posed no negative argument for its joining the European ideal; because the European deal offered much tighter benefits than those of what remained of France’s outside ties.
Conclusion.
France’s optimism towards economics as a means for uniting herself with Germany is demonstrated clearly through the factors summarised above. As Monnet said in 1962, “…the West are witnessing the emergence of a truly mass society marked by mass consumption…”[17], implying that the political and societal unity is intrinsically linked to positively economic methods. In addition, La Malfo proclaimed that “…throwing this bridge across the Rhine…” represented the only way that European antagonism could be solved[18].
In comparison to these optimistic views of the usefulness of economic ties in uniting Europe, is the British reluctance to commit to any positive European economic integration to begin with. The British appeared to use economic factors as reasons to stay outside of the fast moving European integration on the continent. Instead, they looked more positively towards economics that included the Commonwealth and Empire such as the attempt to set up the Free Trade Area around 1957.
Britain no doubt served as a contentious partner in discussions over the integration of Europe. While she started out as a country with strong advocates for European integration (such as Churchill), the attitude within Britain was not one that was willing to accept economic factors that would pull her away from her preferred imperial trading. Whereas France saw the unity through economic terms in a positive and more enthusiastic light. Nelson and Stubb comment in their introduction to the preambles of the Rome Treaties, that the treaties demonstrated a shift towards more economic prosperity concern than to peace in Europe[19]. The emphasis in the Rome Treaties on economics only highlights the British pessimistic perspective of exclusive trade within Europe, and away from the colonies.
As La Malfo noted in 1957, “When speaking of European integration, it is difficult to separate economic from political considerations.”[20] So the assertion here is that even though the economics was used to achieve the ends of peace in Europe, from the positions of the United Kingdom and France came two very different uses of economic situation. The United Kingdom was hesitant to see the economic benefits that the European Coal and Steel Community could offer, while France used the economics as reason to back up her argument to enter.
Bibliography
Books.
Curtis, M, Western European integration, (New York; Harper & Row, 1965)
Davidson, I, Britain and the making of Europe, (London; Macdonald, 1971)
Haines, C. G., (ed) European Integration, (Baltimore; John Hopkins Press, 1957)
Kitzinger, U. (ed), Britain, Europe and Beyond, (Leyden, A.W; Sythoff, 1964)
Nelson and Stubb (eds) The European Union : readings on the theory and practice of European integration, (Boulder, Colo; L. Rienner, 1998)
Paxton, Robert O, Europe in the Twentieth Century, (Ontario; Wadsworth, 2005)
Wood, Ian S, Churchill, (New York; St. Martin’s Press, 2000)
Official documentation.
Churchill in Hansard 1950, volume 473
Bevin in Hansard 1950, volume 473
Ridsdale in Hansard 1958, volume 481
Class lectures.
2nd November 2005.
Written by: Catherine Powell
Written at: University of Victoria, BC Canada